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The Pennsylvania County Personal Property Tax Is
Unconstitutional in Violation of the Commerce
Clause: Annenberg v. Commonwealth
TAXATION - COMMERCE CLAUSE - COMPENSATORY TAX DOCTRINE -
REMEDIES - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the stock
clause of the Pennsylvania County Personal Property Tax,
exempting from taxation the stock of domestic corporations held
by Pennsylvania residents, was unconstitutional because it could
not overcome the presumption of invalidity resulting from facial
discrimination by meeting the requirements of the compensatory
tax doctrine; however, the court allowed the levying counties to
keep the funds previously collected under the unconstitutional tax.
Annenberg v. Commmonwealth, 757 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000)
In 1998, Walter and Leonore Annenberg, as well as Walter H.
Annenberg, the sole trustee for the testamentary trust of Moses L.
Annenberg,' sought from the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
injunctive relief and a declaration that the stock clause of the
Pennsylvania County Personal Property Tax 2  violated the
1. Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000) ("Annenberg H'. The caption
in full includes as named defendants, in addition to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the
Commonwealth's Attorney General, the Board of Commissioners of the County of
Montgomery, and the Board of Assessment Appeals of the County of Montgomery.
Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 338. Additionally, the County Commissioners' Association of
Pennsylvania and the Boards of County Commissioners of Adams, Chester, Dauphin, Indiana,
Lackawanna, Schuykill, Warren, and York counties were granted intervenor status upon per
curiam order ("Intervenor Counties"). Id.
2. Annenberg H, 757 A.2d at 341. Pennsylvania's Personal Property Tax is codified at 72
PA CONS. STAT. § 4821 (2000). The tax imposes a four mill tax on various loans, credits,
securities and other personal property for city and county purposes. The stock clause of the
Personal Property Tax states:
[The property tax will apply to] all shares of stock in any bank, corporation,
association, company, or limited partnership, created or formed under the laws of this
Commonwealth of the United States, or of any other state or government, except
shares of stock in any bank, bank and trust company, national banking association,
savings institution, corporation, or limited partnership liable to a tax on its shares or a
gross premiums tax, or liable to or relieved from the capital stock or franchise tax for
State purposes under the laws of this Commonwealth ....
Id. The capital stock tax applies to companies organized under Pennsylvania laws. 72 PA
CoNs. STAT. § 7602(a) (2000). The franchise tax applies to companies that do business in and
are taxed by Pennsylvania, though organized under the laws of any other jurisdiction. 72 PA-
CONS. STAT. §§ 7602(b), 7601 (2000). Analyzing these statutes together, the effect of the stock
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Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,3 making it null
and void with respect to any corporate stock that they held.4 The
commonwealth court declined to exercise jurisdiction and
transferred the action to the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County.5 Upon granting the Annenbergs' petition for
review under plenary jurisdiction,6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Annenberg I held that the stock clause facially discriminates
against interstate commerce.7 However, the court did not declare
the stock clause unconstitutional but, instead, remanded the case
clause is the taxation of the stock of companies foreign to Pennsylvania and with no taxable
nexus to Pennsylvania. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 341 n.4. The court refers to the stock
clause as an exemption because it excludes domestic stock from the tax. Id. at 341.
3. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 341. The Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution states "Congress shall have Power [t]o . .. regulate Commerce ... among the
several States ... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This part of the Commerce Clause, usually
referred to as the "negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause ("Commerce Clause"), reflects
the inability of the States to discriminate against, or burden the flow of, interstate
commerce. Oregon Waste v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994); Fulton Corp. v.
Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996).
4. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 341. The fair market value of the stock of foreign
corporations doing business outside of Pennsylvania that was held by the Trust under the
Will of Moses L Annenberg was $725,994,938.00 in 1996. Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 757
A_2d 333, 335 n.3 (Pa 2000) (" Annenberg I"). The fair market value of the stock of foreign
corporations doing business outside of Pennsylvania that was held by Walter and Leonore
Annenberg was $120,535,800.00 in 1996. Id. The petitioners filed this action upon the
issuance of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fulton which held that a North
Carolina statute that taxed residents' stock in corporations with no business ties to the state
violated the Commerce Clause. Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 686 A.2d 1380, 1381 (Pa
Commw. 1996) ("Annenberg").
5. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 341. The commonwealth court stated in its opinion
declining jurisdiction that "the Commonwealth has not shown to be an indispensable party to
this action. The proper forum for the original adjudication of this matter is the court of
common pleas sitting in equity." Annenberg, 686 A.2d at 1385. For the commonwealth court
to have proper original jurisdiction, the Commonwealth must be an indispensable party to
the action. 42 PA- CONS. STAT. § 761(a)(1) (2000).
6. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 341. Plenary jurisdiction means that a court has complete
adjudicative power over the subject matter and parties in a case. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 857
(7' ed. 1999).
7. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 342. In Annenberg I, the court discussed Fulton at length,
a case the Annenbergs relied heavily upon in arguing that the stock clause facially
discriminated against interstate commerce. Annenberg I, 757 A.2d at 335-37. The court
agreed with the Annenbergs, explaining that:
[T]he tax is imposed on the stock of foreign corporations which do not do business in
or have a taxable nexus with Pennsylvania, while the stock of corporations which do
business in or otherwise have a taxable nexus with this Commonwealth is exempted.
The discrimination against foreign corporations, and the preferential treatment
afforded corporations which were either incorporated in Pennsylvania or do business
in Pennsylvania, is plain to see.
Id. at 337.
Annenberg v. Commonwealth
back to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.8
The Annenberg I court noted that the presumption of invalidity
surrounding the stock clause could be rebutted by a demonstration
that it is a "compensatory tax" aimed at making interstate
commerce bear the burden already sustained by intrastate
commerce.9 In his opinion for the majority, Justice Cappy stated
that the determination of whether the stock clause is a valid
compensatory tax is a factual question to be decided in reference
to three requirements that the U.S. Supreme Court set out in
Fulton v. Faulkner.10 On remand, court of common pleas President
Judge Joseph A. Smyth filed an Interim Report containing his
findings with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court." The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court mentioned that, after having exercised plenary
jurisdiction in Annenberg I and then remanding the case to the
common pleas court to act as special master, the supreme court
did not relinquish its plenary jurisdiction and its power to review
the case de novo even though the Interim Report contained
findings of fact and conclusions of law.12
The Annenberg II court, in an opinion written by Justice
Zappala, addressed the issue of whether the stock clause, as part of
the Personal Property Tax, is a compensatory tax.13 The majority
held that the stock clause is not a compensatory tax and, therefore,
is null and void, because the Commonwealth failed to meet its
8. Annenberg I, 757 A.2d at 338.
9. Id. at 335, 337. A tax that facially discriminates against interstate commerce is
presumed to be invalid. See infra note 72.
10. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 372. See Annenberg I, 757 A.2d at 337-38. In Fulton, the
Supreme Court delineated the three essential conditions for a valid compensatory tax, as
established in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937), and restated in Oregon
Waste. Fulton, 516 U.S. at 332-33. These conditions will be discussed herein. See infra notes
84-98 and accompanying text.
11. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 343. The court noted that, while not bound by Judge
Smyth's findings, it duly considered those findings of fact in its decision. Id.
12. Id. at 342-43. De novo review occurs when an appellate court uses the trial court's
record, but grants no deference to the trial court's rulings on the evidence and legal
conclusions. BLACK's LAW DICrONARY 94 (7' ed. 1999).
13. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 342-43. A compensatory tax has been defined in case law
as "a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means .... [by] impos[ing] on
interstate commerce the rough equivalent of an identifiable and 'substantially similar' tax on
intrastate commerce [which] does not offend the negative Commerce Clause." Oregon Waste,
511 U.S. at 102-03 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758-59 (1981)). A tax facially
discriminates if it taxes an incident or transaction occurring out of the state more heavily
than if it occured within the state. Christopher J. Hess, The Constitutionality of Taxing the
"Stranger Within the Gates": The Impact of Fulton v. Faulkner on the Pennsylvania County
Personal Property Tax, 16 J.L & COM. 233, II A. 1 & n.21 (1997).
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burden of proof.'4 According to Justice Zappala's opinion, three
benchmark conditions exist which, if met, will overcome the
presumption of invalidity surrounding a facially discriminatory tax
by showing that the provision is actually a compensatory tax
"designed simply to make interstate commerce bear a burden
already borne by intrastate commerce."1 5 A failure to establish any
one of the requirements is fatal; if the taxing authority cannot meet
its burden with respect to all three conditions, the disputed tax is
invalid and may not be levied.' 6
The first requirement directs the Commonwealth to identify the
particular intrastate tax burden for which the facially
discriminatory tax, here the stock clause, is designed to
compensate. 17 This can be demonstrated by proving that the tax on
interstate commerce "is fairly related to the services provided by
the State" that actually benefit interstate commerce.'8 To satisfy this
requirement, the Commonwealth attempted to prove that the stock
clause was part of a comprehensive tax scheme designed to
compensate for the capital stock and franchise taxes already
imposed. 9 The majority rejected this argument after examining the
history of personal property taxes in Pennsylvania and concluding
that each of the taxes comprising the Personal Property Tax
developed independently with no correlation between them.20 Also,
in an attempt to prove that the stock clause is fairly related to the
state-provided services, the Commonwealth neglected to show to
what extent the services were utilized by the corporations doing
business outside of Pennsylvania, benefiting interstate commerce.2'
Due to this oversight, the court found that the Commonwealth did
not meet the first prong of the Fulton test; nevertheless, the court
14. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 346.
15. Id. at 342 (citing Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331). See supra notes 10, 13.
16. Id. at 343.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Fulton, 516 U.S. at 334).
19. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 343. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
20. Id at 343-44. The opinion states that although the first personal property tax was
imposed in 1831, Pennsylvania enacted the first capital stock tax, applicable only to
Pennsylvania corporations, in 1840. Id. at 344. The legislature expanded the scope of the
capital stock tax in 1868 to include foreign corporations doing business in the
Commonwealth. Id. Subsequent amendments in 1889, 1935, 1939, and 1978 brought the
Personal Property Tax into its form, now at issue, which excludes the stock of companies
that pay the capital stock or franchise taxes. Id. Currently, the Personal Property Tax
permits counties to levy it at their discretion. 72 PA_ CONS. STAT. § 4821.1 (2000). See also
Annenberg II, 757 A2d at 344.
21. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 344.
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went on to analyze the two remaining conditions.22
Secondly, to overcome the presumptive invalidity of a facially
discriminatory tax, the Commonwealth needed to demonstrate that
the tax on interstate commerce, imposed by the stock clause,
approximates but does not exceed the amount of the tax on
intrastate commerce (here imposed by the capital stock and
franchise taxes applicable to corporations doing business in
Pennsylvania).2 Using its expert witness's calculations, the
Commonwealth attempted to illustrate this condition. 24 But the
majority frustrated this attempt by rejecting the expert's testimony
regarding the allocation of the capital stock and franchise taxes
collected from 1992 to 1996.25 The majority reasoned that the
expert did not clearly apportion the collected mills between the
local entities that can collect the Personal Property Tax, the
counties, and those that cannot, like municipalities and school
districts.26  Additionally, the court noted that the expert's
distribution figures inaccurately indicated that all counties collected
the Personal Property Tax.
27
The supreme court completed its analysis of the Fulton
conditions by examining the third requirement that the events upon
which the interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed are
"substantially similar."28 Relying on Judge Smyth's factual findings
in the Interim Report, the majority determined that the Personal
Property Tax stock clause was too unlike the capital stock and
franchise taxes to be compensatory because of their varying
valuation calculations and their imposition on different levels of
government.29 As a result of the stock clause failing to meet any of
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 344-45. The expert, with a background in economics and public policy, stated
that the aforementioned taxes were collected at the rate of 12.75 mills, 12 mills of which
went into a state-wide distributed general fund and the other portion to specific funds. Id.
25. Id. The expert's testimony apportioned part of the general fund distributed to local
governments in an attempt to equate the millage collected by the local governments via fund
distribution with the Personal Property Tax. Id.
26. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 345.
27. Id. As previously mentioned, counties are not required to collect the Personal
Property Tax, and not all do. See supra note 20. The expert was needed to accurately assess
whether the personal property taxes collected would equal a county's distribution of capital
stock and franchise taxes from the general fund. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Fulton, 516 U.S. at 333). "Substantially similar" means so "similar in
substance to serve as mutually exclusive 'prox[ies] for each other.' " Id.
29. Id. at 345-46. The Annenbergs' expert witness testified that the Personal Property
Tax is based on the value of shares on a particular day, but that the capital stock and
franchise taxes are assessed on economic flow. Id. The court truncated any discussion
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the three Fulton requisites for a valid compensatory tax, the court
found it an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause.30
After finding the stock clause unconstitutional, the Annenberg II
court moved to the issue of whether the unconstitutional stock
clause is severable from the remainder of the Personal Property
Tax statute; if not, the entire Personal Property Tax scheme would
be invalid.31  The Annenbergs argued against Judge Smyth's
recommendation for clause severance, making the tax applicable to
all classes of stock, by averring that the Personal Property Tax on
stock should be entirely stricken.32 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declared that it need only examine whether the legislature
would have enacted the statute without the void provision.3 The
court determined that the stock clause should be severed, and
proceeded with a discussion of the remedy available to the
Annenbergs. 4
After acknowledging the court's power to grant relief to the
Annenbergs,35  Justice Zappala commented on Judge Smyth's
suggested remedy in the Interim Report - the counties that
collected a tax pursuant to the stock clause should be able to
retain the funds collected, but should not be able to retroactively
collect tax on stock that was exempt (stock that was taxed under
the capital stock and franchise taxes).36 Moreover, Judge Smyth
also noted that as a result of striking the stock clause, the Personal
Property Tax would expand to cover the stock not formerly taxed;
regarding the imposition of the taxes on the different government levels by resolving that the
taxes had already been proven sufficiently different. Id.
30. Id. at 346.
31. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 346. The court discussed certain Pennsylvania principles
of statutory construction, stating that:
The provisions of every statute shall be severable . . . unless the court finds that the
valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with...
the void provision ... that it cannot be presumed the General Assembly would have
enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one ....
Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1925 (2000)).
32. Id. at 346-47. The Annenbergs supported their argument by explaining that in 1996
the Pennsylvania legislature rejected a bill that proposed to enlarge the Personal Property
Tax to apply to all classes of stock. Id. at 346. They reasoned that merely severing the stock
clause would frustrate the intent of the legislativ6 body and exceed the "severing" powers of
the court. Id. at 347. The majority discarded the Annenbergs' analysis, and stated that only a
minute portion of the rejected bill concerned the Personal Property Tax, and that their
argument incorrectly focused on legislative intent after the statute was enacted. Id.
33. Id. at 347.
34. Id. at 348.
35. Id.
36. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 349.
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therefore, Judge Smyth advised that the collection of the "new"
Personal Property Tax should only be prospective.
37
After reviewing the lower court's recommendations, the majority
entered into a lengthy discussion of United States Supreme Court
cases to assess the proper relief for the Annenbergs.38 Citing
McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco,39 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the Commonwealth could
either refund the difference between the tax with the
unconstitutional exemption and the tax paid without it; assess and
collect back taxes from those who had benefited from the
unconstitutional exemption; or make a partial refund in
combination with a partial assessment so that each provision
complies with a nondiscriminatory tax scheme.40 The
Commonwealth argued that the court was not mandated by
McKesson to apply a retrospective remedy and, thus, should deny
the Annenbergs a refund.4' The court, however, rejected the
Commonwealth's argument, stating that, because the U.S. Supreme
Court rulings control legal issues involving federal questions, a
state court is not free to circumscribe federal law controlling
retrospective remedies.
42
Turning to the Annenbergs' request for a statutorily-required
refund, Justice Zappala maintained that the statute relied upon by
the Annenbergs was inapplicable to the instant matter because it
mandates that obligatory refunds should be paid only by political
37. Id.
38. Id..
39. 496 U.S. 18 (1990). McKesson consisted of a similar factual situation that led to a
finding that a Florida law violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against
out-of-state products. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 349. The United States Supreme Court held
that the State needed to provide retroactive relief for those deprived of money under the
unconstitutional provision of the statute. Id.
40. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 349-50.
41. Id. at 350. The Counties relied on three decisions to support their contention. Id. In
American Trucldng Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court
remanded the case back to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for consideration of retroactive
relief. Id. In American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990), the Court, in a
plurality opinion, concluded that a three part test applies to determine whether a decision
should apply retroactively. Id. The ruling in the third case, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
McNulty, 596 A.2d 784 (Pa 1991), relied on the Smith opinion to conclude that no
retrospective relief should be issued. Id.
42. Id. at 350-51. The opinion mentioned that the three part test the Smith decision
relied upon was subsequently overruled. Id. Furthermore, because the legal question
concerned the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court concluded that it must
follow the Supreme Court's decisions regarding retroactivity. Id.
2001
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subdivisions that are "not legally entitled" to the collected taxes.43
The majority reasoned that by severing the unconstitutional stock
clause from the remainder of the Personal Property Tax scheme,
counties remain able to levy a Personal Property Tax on all
corporate stock holdings, domestic and foreign." Thus, because all
stock holdings are taxable by counties, the court contended that
when the stock clause was in force, the Annenbergs were
effectively exempted from paying tax on the stock of corporations
in or with a taxable nexus to Pennsylvania.45 The majority
concluded that Montgomery County was legally entitled to levy the
Personal Property Tax even though therein was an unconstitutional
exemption.46 As a result, the court held that the Counties must
apply a retrospective remedy to conform to its opinion.
4 7
Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Nigro, concurred in part and
dissented in part.48 While agreeing with the majority as to the
unconstitutionality and the propriety of severing the stock clause,
Justice Cappy objected to the remedy imposed by the court.
49
Referencing the Annenbergs' argument favoring a refund, Justice
Cappy first declared that the majority misapplied McKesson;
instead of McKesson dictating a refund as the appropriate remedy,
the court read McKesson as stating that the Commonwealth had
various options in creating a retrospective remedy.5° Secondly, the
43. Id. at 352-53. The refund statute reads in pertinent part:
Whenever any person or corporation of this Commonwealth has paid or caused to be
paid... into the treasury of any political subdivision, directly or indirectly, voluntarily
or under protest, any taxes of any sort,... or any other moneys to which the political
subdivision is not legally entitled; then, in such cases, the proper authorities of the
political subdivision, upon the filing with them of a written and verified claim for the
refund of the payment, are hereby directed to make, refund of such taxes ....
(c)(1) Any taxpayer who has paid any tax money to which the political subdivision
is not legally entitled shall receive interest on such sum of money ....
72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5566b (a), (c)(1) (2000).
44. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 352.
45. Id.
46. Id. At this point Justice Zappala discussed the dissenting opinion, reading it to
imply that Justices Cappy and Nigro believed that the U.S. Supreme Court incorrectly
approved an unlawful remedy in McKesson by allowing the taxing authority to retain the
taxes collected under an unconstitutional provision and collect back taxes from those who
benefited from the illegal provision. Id. The majority asserted its skepticism that the
Supreme Court would condone a remedy allowing a taxing authority to retain taxes to which
it was not legally entitled. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (Cappy, J., concurring and dissenting).
49. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 352-53.
50. Id. at 353.
Annenberg v. Commonwealth
partial dissent vigorously criticized the majority's remedy analysis
characterizing the unconstitutional tax as an "illegal exemption" as
opposed to an "illegal entitlement."1 Justice Cappy described the
majority's conclusion that a county is legally entitled to retain
funds collected from an unconstitutional tax as "internally
inconsistent."52 Justice Cappy reasoned that a tax that was
unconstitutionally collected is one to which the taxing authority
was not legally entitled; therefore, the Annenbergs were
statutorily-entitled to receive a refund.5
The negative Commerce Clause has long been used as both a
sword by federal and state governments imposing legislation, and
as a shield by those attempting to protect themselves from such
laws.54 Even in the earliest days of our country, the founders
recognized the importance of fairness in trade between states.
James Madison commented on the effect of a lack of federal
government regulation of interstate commerce: "the desire of the
commercial states to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from
their uncommercial neighbors must appear not less impolitic than it
is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party by resentment
as well as interest to resort to less convenient channels for their
foreign trade."55 Relatively speaking, however, the notion that state
taxation may violate the Commerce Clause has only recently
developed.
Pennsylvania's Personal Property Tax was first challenged in
Dupuy v. Johns,5 where the court upheld the constitutionality of
the capital stock tax on the basis of the public policy of the
Commonwealth.57 Later, in a different challenge, the Pennsylvania
51. Id. It should be noted that the majority meant by "illegal exemption" that the stock
clause, itself an unconstitutional exemption, thereby illegally precluded collection of tax
monies due on stock held in domestic corporations. Id. Entitlement is defined as an
absolute right to a benefit, which is usually monetary. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (7r ed.
1999). Therefore, an illegal entitlement is the attainment of a monetary benefit not authorized
by law; here, the commonwealth counties were not legally entitled to the monies collected
via the stock clause because it was an unconstitutional tax. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 352.
52. Id. at 352-53.
53. Id. Justice Cappy remarked that a refund order could be satisfied either by
rendering an immediate lump sum monetary payment to the taxpayers, or by granting the
taxpayers a credit for the monies paid pursuant to the unconstitutional tax to offset future
taxes owed to the county. Id.
54. See supra note 3.
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitor ed., 1961).
56. 104 A. 565 (Pa. 1918).
57. Id. at 567. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the public policy was "to




Supreme Court again maintained the validity of the Personal
Property Tax when it was levied on the stock of insurance
companies despite being facially discrininatory.5s Other challenges
to the Pennsylvania Personal Property Tax have been rare.s
In 1937, the first notable attempt by a taxpayer to invalidate a
tax upon constitutional grounds occurred in Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., in which the plaintiff was taxed on chattels brought
into the State of Washington.6° Justice Cardozo reasoned that the
use tax was not directly imposed on interstate commerce, but upon
items acquired in their state of destination after commerce had
ended.6' The Court emphasized that for the constitutionality of a
tax that may discriminate against interstate counerce to remain
intact, there must be "equality" because of the existence of
offsetting taxes.62 This compensatory tax analysis became the
oft-referred to standard:
When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is
subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership
than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon one
activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum
is the same when the reckoning is closed.63
The Supreme Court followed Cardozo's standard over forty years
later in Maryland v. Louisiana, where plaintiffs, various states and
pipeline companies, challenged Louisiana's "first-use" tax imposed
upon any natural gas brought into the state that had not already
been subject to another state or federal tax.6 In analyzing the
58. In re Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities, 27 A.2d 57
(Pa. 1942). This case concerned the 1939 amendment to the Personal Property Tax which, as
an exemption, effectively imposed a four mill tax on Pennsylvania resident owners of stock
in foreign insurance companies, a situation identical to the instant matter. Id. at 58-59. In
defending the overall constitutionality of the amendment, the court stated: "[it is well settled
that a state legislature may without violation of the Constitution of the United States place
stock of domestic and foreign corporations in different classes for purposes of taxation so
long as there is a reasonable basis for the classification." Id. at 60.
59. Hess, supra note 13, at 11. B. 1 n.47.
60. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
61. Id. at 581-82.
62. Id. at 583-84. Sales and use taxes were determined to be taxable events that are
substantially equivalent and, therefore, compensatory taxes. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 105
(citing Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 584).
63. Id. at 584. This passage created the current standard for determining if a
compensatory tax scheme exists.
64. 451 U.S. 725 (1981). The tax was owed by the natural gas owner when the first
taxable use occurred in Louisiana Id. at 731. Approximately 85% of the natural gas brought
into Louisiana was pumped from the Outer Continental Shelf, a federal area in the Gulf of
Vol. 39:681
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states' claim that the First Use Tax violated the Commerce Clause,
the majority, led by Justice White, noted that a state tax may
compel interstate commerce to "pay its own way" under certain
constraints.65 As precursors to the compensatory tax doctrine's
components, the Court asserted that a state's tax upon interstate
commerce must (1) have a substantial nexus with the state; (2) be
fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against interstate
commerce; and (4) fairly relate to the services provided by the
state.6
Additionally, the Court pronounced that a state tax that provides
a direct commercial advantage to a local business discriminates
against interstate commerce.67 In assessing the First Use Tax in
combination with Louisiana's tax scheme, the Court found that a
"Severance Tax Credit," giving First Use Tax payers a tax credit on
any domestic severance tax owed from production of natural gas in
Louisiana, effectively encouraged owners of gas in the federal
production area to invest in mineral exploration and development
in Louisiana rather than in other states, rendering the First Use Tax
facially discriminatory against interstate commerce.6 Furthermore,
the majority stated that the Severance Tax was not a compensating,
complementary tax to the First Use Tax, that is necessary to justify
a state tax's burden on interstate commerce. 69 Finally, the majority
concluded that Cardozo's notion of equality between intrastate and
interstate commerce was violated by the First Use Tax that was,
therefore, unconstitutional.70 The Court closed by stating "[w]e
need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it
unconstitutionally discriminates."7
Mexico. Id.
65. Id. at 754 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)).
66. Id. (citing Washington Revenue Dep't v. Washington Stevedoring Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734
(1978)).
67. Id. (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959)).
68. Id. at 756-57.
69. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 758-59. Justice White commented that Louisiana, via the First
Use Tax, was not protecting any state interest by taxing on the severance of resources from
the federal OCS area, unlike the Severance Tax, which was imposed for the severing of
resources from Louisiana's own grounds. Id.
70. Id. at 759-60 (citing Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 583-84). The majority mentioned that
Louisiana's pattern of credits and exemptions, as demonstrated by the Severance Tax in
conjunction with the First Use Tax, was inequitable and clashed with the Court's notion of a
.compensating effect." Id. at 759. Without elaborating on the claim, Justice White hinted that
the effects of the taxes on other states' markets for gas were not constitutionally
questionable. Id.
71. Id. at 760.
2001
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In the first and most notable of a recent onslaught of Supreme
Court cases concerning taxes facially discriminating against
interstate commerce, Justice Thomas explicitly delineated the three
necessary conditions for a compensatory tax.72 In Oregon Waste v.
Department of Environmental Quality, the Court stated that the
state-imposed surcharge on all solid waste disposed of in Oregon
but generated in other states violated the negative Commerce
Clause.7 3 Because the transactions were taxed more heavily after
crossing into Oregon than they would have been had they occurred
entirely within Oregon, the surcharge tax was seen as facially
discriminatory.
74
The majority declared that a discriminatory tax can still be
constitutionally valid if it advances a legitimate local purpose that
cannot otherwise be served.75 In addition, the Court explained that
a facially discriminatory tax can be rescued by a compensatory tax
if it (1) compensates for an identified intrastate tax burden on
interstate commerce; (2) roughly approximates the amount of
taxation of intrastate commerce; and (3) is imposed on an event
"substantially similar" to that upon which the intrastate tax burden
rests.76 In ultimately determining that the Oregon disposal tax could
not overcome the presumption of invalidity cast upon facially
discriminatory taxes because it was not a valid compensatory tax,
the Supreme Court noted that even though states have broad
discretion with respect to their systems of taxation, they are
forever bound by the limits of the Constitution.
77
Less than two months after the Oregon Waste decision, in
Associated Industries v. Lohman, Justice Thomas once again wrote
for the majority and discussed the constitutionality of a Missouri
statute that uniformly imposed a use tax on all goods purchased
outside of Missouri but used, consumed or stored within the state.
78
72. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 103.
73. Id. at 100.
74. Id. The Court defines discrimination as "differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a
restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid." Id. at 99.
75. Id. at 100-01 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988)).
76. Id. at 103. The Court accumulated this notorious set of requirements from a string
of previous cases concerning various aspects of taxation and the Conunerce Clause. Id.
77. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 108. Also, in reaching its determination that the Oregon
tax at issue failed the three part test propounded by the Court, the majority remarked that
states' regulation of interstate commerce to produce a cost advantage for domestic
businesses encourages economic protectionism between states, which is a policy that has
been condemned by the Court. Id. at 106 (citing New Energy, 486 U.S. at 275).
78. 511 U.S. 641 (1994). The challenged tax was an "additional use tax" of 1.5%,
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The state argued that the use tax was designed to compensate for
local sales taxes; however, because sales tax rates vary by
jurisdiction in Missouri, in many localities the use tax exceeded the
sales tax.79 Using the compensatory tax test consisting of the three
requirements presented in Oregon Waste, the majority stated that
the discrepancy between the use tax and certain local sales taxes
imposed a "discriminatory burden on interstate commerce."8°
Referencing an argument that the patently discriminatory tax
scheme is permissible due to its limited impact across the state as
a whole, the Court responded: "[u]nder our cases, unless one of
several narrow bases of justification is shown . . . actual
discrimination, wherever it is found, is impermissible, and the
magnitude and scope of the discrimination have no bearing on the
determinative question whether discrimination has occurred."
81
Moreover, in addition to holding the Missouri use tax
unconstitutional, 82 Justice Thomas expounded the Court's recent
view that a compensatory tax scheme may save an otherwise
discriminatory tax because such a tax scheme allows a consumer
to freely choose without regard to tax consequences.m
Finally, two years later in Fulton v. Faulkner, a case heavily
relied upon in Annenberg II, the Supreme Court put to rest
questions concerning the constitutionality of a tax on corporate
stock.84 North Carolina had levied on its residents an "Intangibles
Tax" upon the fair market value of all stock of corporations having
a business or commercial nexus to the state.85 The petitioner
imposed on any article of personal property used, consumed, or stored within Missouri, but
purchased outside the state, and this tax was not paired with a complementary sales tax. Id.
at 644.
79. Id. at 643.
80. Id. at 647-49. The Court noted that the discrepancy discriminates against interstate
commerce because it violates the equality rule of Silas Mason. Id. at 649. See supra notes
62-63 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 649-50 (citing Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01).
82. Id. at 654.
83. Associated Indus., 511 U.S. at 652 (citing Boston Stock Exch. v. New York State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 (1977)).
84. Fulton, 516 U.S. at 327.
85. Id. Even though the tax was at the rate of one quarter of one percent, North
Carolina residents subject to the tax were permitted to deduct from it a percentage equal to
the fraction created by comparing the in-state and out-of-state incomes of the corporations.
Id. at 328. The Court illustrated this by stating that:
[A] corporation doing all of its business within the State would pay corporate income
tax on 100% of its income, and the taxable percentage deduction allowed to resident
owners of that corporation's stock under the intangibles tax would likewise be 10096.
Stock in a corporation doing no business in North Carolina ... would be taxable on
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corporations sought, similar to the Annenbergs, declaratory and
injunctive relief on the basis that the tax scheme's deduction
favoring stockowners of domestic corporations violated the
Commerce Clause.
86
Justice Souiter's opinion for the Court first established that the
Intangibles Tax was facially discriminatory because it favored
domestic corporations by taxing their stock only to the extent that
the corporation participated in interstate commerce.87 Because the
state defended the Intangibles Tax on the basis that it was a
compensatory one, the next issue the Court considered was
whether the percentage deduction was actually compensatory.88
According to Justice Souter, the Intangibles Tax did not meet the
first prong of the compensatory tax test; that is, an identifiable
intrastate tax did not exist to compensate for the interstate
burden.
89
Proceeding with the compensatory tax analysis, Justice Souter
considered the state's argument that in comparing the amount of
tax on intrastate and interstate commerce, the corporate income
and intangibles taxes may be evaluated according to the price/
earnings ratios of taxpayer corporations. 9° However, the Court
stated that comparing the corporate income tax to the Intangibles
tax was likening "apples to oranges."9' Because the general
corporate income tax encompasses a variety of services, the Court
found the part of the income tax supporting the capital market not
capable of being determined and then calibrated with the burden
imposed on interstate commerce by the Intangibles Tax.92 In noting
the state's failed attempt to meet the second prong of the
100% of its value.
Id. at 328.
86. Id. at 328-29.
87. Id. at 333. The majority continued by stating that the Intangibles Tax burdens
interstate commerce by discouraging companies domestic to North Carolina from engaging
in interstate commerce. Id.
88. Id. at 334. The state argued that the Intangibles Tax was complementary to the
general corporate income tax. Id.
89. Fu/ton, 516 U.S. at 334. The Court rejected the state's compensatory tax theory that
was based upon the claim that the Intangibles Tax was merely compensating for the cost of
allowing access to North Carolina capital markets. Id. at 335-36.
90. Id. at 336-37. The price/earnings ratio compares the value of a corporation's stock
to its earnings. Id. at 337. The Court disregarded the calculations given by the state not as
incorrect, but as irrelevant. Id.
91. Id. at 337.
92. Id. at 337-38. Justice Souter stated that the proper comparison was between the




compensatory tax test, the majority reaffirmed its unwillingness to
allow "discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce to compensate
for charges purportedly included in general forms of intrastate
taxation."9 3
Lastly, the Court confronted the third prong of the compensatory
tax test that mandates that the compensating taxes fall on
substantially equivalent events.94  Demonstrating reluctance to
question precedent, Justice Thomas noted that only sales and use
taxes, taken together, have sustained the compensatory tax analysis
in recent memory.95 Not surprisingly, the Court rejected the State's
argument that substantial equivalence could be shown using a
valuation formula linking the share value subject to the Intangibles
* Tax to the percentage of income earned within North Carolina for
the corporate income tax.96 The majority stated that even assuming
such a formula to be accurate, more is necessary to meet the
objective of providing domestic and foreign businesses equal
treatment.97 Finally, the majority explained that for the most part,
only sales and use taxes will be found to be compensatory.
98
In each of the aforementioned cases,9 the U.S. Supreme Court
did not decide what specific remedy would be appropriate for the
payers of the unconstitutional taxes. In Maryland, the Court.merely
stated, after declaring the First-Use Tax unconstitutional, that
"[judgment [shall be] to that effect and enjoining further collection
of the Tax shall be entered. Jurisdiction... is retained in the event
93. Id. at 338 (citing Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 105 n.8). The Court mentioned the
difficulty in making the necessary quantitative assessments for the compensatory tax where
a general taxation form exists. Id.
94. Fu/ton, 511 U.S. at 338.
95. Id. at 338-39. The majority cited a group of cases, such as Maryland and Oregon
Waste, in which the Court rejected equivalence arguments concerning various taxes. Id.
Reiterating the difficult standard of Oregon Waste, the majority stated that "the paired
activities were not 'sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive prox[ies]
for each other.' " Id. at 339 (quoting Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 103). See supra note 28.
96. Id. at 339-40. The State claimed that the Intangibles and corporate income taxes fell
on substantially equivalent values because corporate earnings affect stock value. Id.
97. Id. at 340.
98. Id. at 341-42. Justice Thomas noted that economic elements, such as supply,
demand, and the elasticities of each, will contribute to the difficulty in assessing the relative
economic burdens of taxes. Id. Furthermore, the State failed to analyze the complexity of
the tax burdens to explain its theory. Id. at 343. The Court reiterated that the taxing
authority must demonstrate the justification for a facially discriminatory tax, and if it
chooses to rely upon the compensatory tax doctrine, each of the conditions must be clearly
proven. Id. at 344.
99. See, e.g., Maryland, 451 U.S. 725; Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. 93; Associated Industries,
511 U.S. 641; Fzaton, 516 U.S. 325.
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that further proceedings are required to implement the
judgment."' 0° In Oregon Waste, Justice Thomas ignored the remedial
issue altogether.' °' In Associated Industries, however, Justice
Thomas mentioned McKesson and asserted that "any effect
Missouri's procedures might have on the appropriate remedy in this
case is best left for consideration on remand . . . ."0 Also, Justice
Souter in Fulton, noting the McKesson decision, commented that
states have some flexibility in remedying an unconstitutional tax, as
long as the new scheme does not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 103
However, when a state court fashions an inappropriate remedy
premised on federal law, the Supreme Court will confront the
issue, as demonstrated by the McKesson decision.' °4 The McKesson
case originated in Florida, where the Florida Supreme Court held
that the state's liquor excise tax was unconstitutional in violation of
the Commerce Clause, but denied the objecting taxpayer,
McKesson Corporation, a refund or any other relief for the taxes
paid under the unconstitutional scheme.'05 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Brennan commented that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to furnish taxpayers
with a "meaningful opportunity to secure postpayment relief.""°6
The Court discussed whether prospective relief, by itself, is
sufficient under federal law. 07 Utilizing a due process theory, the
Court reasoned that taxation is a form of property deprivation, and,
therefore, state procedural safeguards must exist to avoid
unconstitutional exactions.108
Justice Brennan contended that Florida had flexibility in
100. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 760.
101. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 108.
102. Associated Indus., 511 U.S. at 656.
103. Filton, 516 U.S. at 346-47.
104. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22.
105. Id.
106. Id. A postdeprivation remedy (i.e., postpayment relief) is sought when taxpayers
pay the tax and then litigate over its assessment. Id. Notably, Florida had a "Repayment of
Funds" statute which provided that any overpayment of a tax, license, or account due
entitled the payor to a refund. Id. at 24.
107. Id. at 32-36. The Court asserted that Atchison, T & SER. Co. v. O'Connor, 223
U.S. 280 (1912); Ward v. Love County Board of Commissioners, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Montana
National Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499 (1928); Iowa-Des Moines National Bank
v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) all support the proposition that a state is obligated to provide
some retrospective relief for taxpayers previously deprived of their money under an
unconstitutional tax. Id. at 32.
108. Id. at 36.
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determining whether a refund was appropriate relief.109 Specifically,
three possible remedies were considered by the Court."0 First, the
state could refund to the taxpayer the difference between the
unconstitutional tax paid and that which would have been paid in a
constitutional scheme."' Second, the state could collect back taxes
from those who benefited from the unconstitutional tax."2 Lastly,
the state could issue a partial refund to the taxpayer in
combination with a partial retroactive tax increase on those who
benefited from the unconstitutional scheme.
13
The Court rejected Florida's contention that it need only restore
the taxpayer to its original position."' Justice Brennan announced
that only a refund or one of the other retroactive remedies would
provide treatment equivalent to the requested injunctive relief."
5
Although the opinion noted that a refund would create various
administrative costs, the Court disregarded this fact, leaving it to
the state to consider in choosing its method of relief."6 Ultimately,
the holding did not dictate a specific remedy, but designed the
possible choices to cure the unconstitutional discrimination against
interstate commerce.117
Three years later, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
the Supreme Court again discussed a retroactive remedy with
reference to the retirement benefits of federal employees that are
exempted from state taxation."8 Justice Thomas, for the majority,
determined that the decision handed down in Davis v. Michigan
109. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 39-40. Justice Brennan noted that the state's remedial
actions are bound by the dictates of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 40.
110. Id. at 40-41.
111. Id. at 40.
112. Id. The back taxes would have to be adjusted to create a retroactive,
nondiscriminatory scheme. Id.
113. Id. at 41.
114. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 43. Florida argued that if it had known that its excise tax
would be declared unconstitutional, it would have levied a higher flat tax rate, causing
McKesson to have paid the same tax regardless. Id. at 41. Also, the state feared that payers
of the unconstitutional tax would receive a windfall via retrospective relief. Id. at 41-42, 46.
The Court found that no postdeprivation relief would occur under Florida's proposed
remedy. Id. at 43.
115. Id. Justice Brennan commented that Florida's "equitable considerations" argument
favoring prospective relief was not sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of
retrospective relief. Id. at 44-45. Additionally, Florida contended that the taxpayer, as a
corporation, would pass the cost of the tax on to its customers, thereby receiving a windfall.
Id. The Court rejected this rationale for not providing a refund to the taxpayers. Id. at 46-47.
116. Id. at 50-51.
117. Id. at 51.
118. 509 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1993).
2001 697
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 39:681
Department of Treasury, holding that a state cannot tax an
individual on retirement benefits paid by the federal government
while exempting retirement benefits paid by the state, applied in
Harper as well.119 Using Davis for the conclusion that retroactive
relief was necessary, the Court stopped short of pronouncing the
specific relief required by relying on McKesson and giving the state
limited flexibility in choosing a remedy.120 Justice Thomas indicated
that federal due process provides only the minimum requirements
for state-chosen relief; the state may provide relief beyond such
demands, but cannot grant any less.
12'
Both of these landmark decisions regarding the remedies
available after the payment of an unconstitutional tax were
premised on Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, which involved a
situation not unlike the ones previously discussed.122 Hawaii
imposed a 20% excise tax on the sale of wholesale liquor but
exempted certain locally produced alcoholic beverages. 23 Not
surprisingly, Justice White found that the liquor tax facially
discriminated against interstate commerce by giving the exempt
local alcoholic beverages a commercial advantage. 124 Also, the
Court noted Hawaii's attempt at economic protectionism via the tax
statute, and struck down the exemption as unconstitutional. 25
119. Id. at 89 (citing Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)).
120. Id. at 100-01. The Court's opinion quoted McKesson in its explanation of remedy
options, each of which was constrained to "meaningful backward-looking relief" if no
postdeprivation remedy existed. Id. at 101 (quoting McKesson, 496 U.S. at 40).
121. Id. at 102.
122. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
123. Id. at 265. Fruit wines, most commonly pineapple wine, and okolehao, a brandy
made from ti root, were exempted from the tax due to the legislature's desire to encourage
the state's liquor industry. Id. at 265, 269.
124. Id. at 268. With its conclusion, the majority affirmed "[a] cardinal rule of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence" - a state cannot impose a tax facially discriminating
against interstate commerce for the purpose of providing a local business with a direct
commercial advantage. Id. (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,
329 (1977)).
125. Id. at 270. The majority mentioned that economic protectionism, which
discourages interstate commerce, can be detected from the discriminatory purpose or effect
of a statute. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53
(1977) and Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). This motivation was
evidenced by Hawaii's justification for the imposition of the liquor tax. See supra note 114.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the obvious facial discrimination, illustrated by the tax's
purpose, precluded an inquiry into the balance between the local benefits of the tax and its
burden on interstate commerce. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 270, 272. On the same note,
the majority rejected the notion that the Hawaii Legislature did not intend to discriminate
against foreign industry, acknowledging that the motivation for protectionist measures is
usually not to burden one party, but to impose a benefit on another. Id. at 273.
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The wholesale taxpayers sought a refund of all liquor taxes
paid.126 Addressing this issue, Justice White remarked that the
Hawaii state courts never confronted the issue of an appropriate
remedy because the tax was upheld as nondiscriminatory, but that
in doing so upon remand, federal constitutional issues could be
affected by remedial issues under state law.127 Furthermore, the
Court foreshadowed its decision less than six years later in
McKesson by suggesting that a refund could be mandated by state
law after a determination of unconstitutional discrimination against
interstate commerce.128  In addition, Justice Stevens's dissent
revealed an obstacle that could block the provision of an
appropriate remedy - actual recovery. Though not the basis for his
dissent, he wrote, "I am skeptical about the ability of the
wholesalers to prove that the exemption . . . has harmed their
businesses at all .... Even if some minimal harm can be proved, I
am even more skeptical about the possibility that it will result in
the multimilhion-dollar refund that the wholesalers are claiming."
1't
Most recently, the Tax Court of Indiana, in Bulkmatic
Transportation Co. v. Department of State Revenue, expounded
that a refund is the most likely and opportune means for the
taxpayers of an unconstitutional tax to receive relief.130 The court
declared a proportional use exemption from motor carrier fuel
taxes for use in Indiana unconstitutional in violation of the
Commerce Clause because "motor carriers are unable to make a
tax-neutral decision .... "131 The taxpayers applied for a refund
under Indiana statute as a postdeprivation remedy.' 32 The tax court
noted that under Harper the taxpayers were entitled to meaningful
retrospective relief but not necessarily a refund.'1' However, to "set
126. Id. at 266. Under a Hawaii statute, HAW. REV. STAT. § 40-35 (Supp. 1983), the
taxpayers were required to pay their taxes under protest before bringing an action to recover
the sus as a refund. See supra note 106. Collectively, the wholesalers' refund claim totaled
approximately $45 million for a period of roughly two years. Id. at 266 & n.3.
127. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 277. See supra note 105.
128. Id. at 277 n.14. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 40-52.
129. Id. at 278.
130. 715 N.E.2d 26, 35 (1999).
131. Id. at 32. The Tax Court explained that the taxpayer motor carriers would be
more inclined, because of the use exemption, to consume their gas in Indiana where the gas
is exempted. Id. "By engaging in this discrimination, Indiana is exercising its power to tax
motor fuel to coerce the direction of additional economic activity to Indiana." Id.
132. Id. at 35. An Indiana statute, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-64.1-4(d), 6-4.5(d) (Supp. 1998)
(amended 1999) required the taxpayers to first pay the tax under protest, then claim a
refund. Id. at 28, 35.
133. Id. (citing Harper, 509 U.S. at 101).
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the constitutional balance correct," the court determined that the
most likely method of doing so was by a refund.34
In declaring the stock clause of the Pennsylvania County
Personal Property Tax unconstitutional in Annenberg II, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to follow the remedial
measures set forth in the precedents discussing taxes violative of
the Commerce Clause. 135 The court did comply with every element
of the compensatory tax doctrine presented in Fulton and its
predecessors, but it disregarded the remedy that naturally follows
the court's legal determination.
136
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court correctly concluded that the stock
clause was unconstitutional as a violation of the Commerce Clause,
and that the elements of the compensatory tax doctrine were not
clearly met.13 The court would have had to completely ignore the
compensatory tax analysis of Fulton to find the compensatory tax
test satisfied because the Pennsylvania Personal Property Tax was
arguably more detrimental to interstate commerce than was North
Carolina's Intangibles Tax. The County Personal Property Tax was
levied upon the stock of corporations that were foreign to
Pennsylvania, had no taxable nexus with Pennsylvania and
generated their income from outside the Commonwealth.
1
3
Conversely, any corporation that even minimally participated in the
Pennsylvania markets was wholly exempted by the stock clause.
139
On the other hand, North Carolina's Intangibles Tax provided a
corporation with an exemption proportional to the amount of
business conducted within the state.40 Consequently, because
Pennsylvania forced corporations to subject themselves to total
taxation before the stock clause exemption was allowed,' 4 ' the
Personal Property Tax was disputably more burdensome upon
interstate commerce than was the Intangibles Tax.
The County Personal Property Tax arose from the economic
134. Id. at 35 & n. 18. The court mentioned the possibility for Indiana to provide
another adequate remedy without refunds. Id.
135. See supra notes 104-29 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 14-30, 38-53, 60-98 and accompanying text.
137. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 346. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 341 n.4. See supra note 2.
139. Hess, supra note 13, at II A. 2. & n.36.
140. See supra note 85. See also Brief for Petitioners at 12-13 n.10, Annenberg v.
Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000), (No. 0003, 0004 Misc. Dkt. 1997) (explaining how
the Intangibles Tax was applied with respect to the percentage of a corporation's business
conducted in North Carolina).
141. See Hess, supra note 13, at II A 2.
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protectionism that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.
The Pennsylvania Legislature long ago stated the purpose of the
Personal Property Tax to be the encouragement of domestic
industries. 42 The U.S. Supreme Court struck down this precise
motivation in Bacchus Imports because the negative Commerce
Clause bolsters economic freedom, not economic balkanization.'"
The controversial aspect of the Annenberg II opinion lies not in
the determination of the stock clause's unconstitutionality, but in
the remedy fashioned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. A
remedy 44 enforces a right, or prevents a legal wrong; more
importantly, it connotes that some sort of relief is provided to the
party.145 Upon the determination that the Annenbergs' constitutional
rights were violated, the Commonwealth was allowed to keep the
unconstitutionally collected money. 46 The Annenbergs'
constitutional rights were enforced by the severance of the stock
clause, but the Annenbergs obtained little relief when their desired
remedy, as provided by Pennsylvania law, was denied.
In McKesson, upon which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court based
its remedy, Justice Brennan addressed Florida's claim that no
retrospective relief was due to petitioner taxpayers because the
state need only put them in the same position they would have
been in had there been no tax."41 The McKesson Court quickly
refuted this notion, averring that the state's proposed scheme did
not avoid unlawful deprivation, and that "only an actual refund (or
other retroactive adjustment of the tax burdens borne by petitioner
and/or its favored competitors during the contested tax period) can
bring about the nondiscrimination that 'prompt injunctive relief
would have achieved.' "148 The Annenbergs received no retroactive
relief because they received no effective return of their tax monies.
In McKesson, Florida feared that the Liquor Tax payers would
receive a windfall of tax refunds, and also that the administrative
142. See supra note 57.
143. Fulton, 516 U.S. at 333 n.3. Balkanization refers to dividing a larger entity into
smaller, weaker, inefficient units. THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY 149 (1963).




146. Annenberg II, 757 A.2d at 352. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
147. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 41-42. The state argued that if it had known that the Liquor
Tax would be declared unconstitutional, it would have imposed a higher flat tax rate upon
all distributors, and, therefore, the taxpayers would have paid the same amount of tax
regardless. Id.
148. Id. at 43 (quoting Brief for Respondents for Reargument at 15, Annenberg v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 575 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000), (No. 0003, 0004 Misc. Dkt. 1997)).
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costs of providing the refunds would be inordinate. 149 Consequently,
Florida suggested that the cost of a refund to a state may justify its
withholding.' °  The Supreme Court abruptly rejected this
argument. 15 1 In discussing possible retrospective remedies, the
Court declared that "the State's interest in financial stability does
not justify a refusal to provide relief."152 It appears that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Florida's economic argument
in denying the Annenbergs any refund, and thereby failed to adhere
to constitutional precedent.'5
Despite the difficulty and expense caused by the refund of
monies collected under the stock clause, it could be the only viable
means of providing taxpayers with meaningful relief. As the U.S.
Supreme Court discussed in McKesson, three retrospective options
are available, the first one being a full refund to the taxpayers. 54
The second option, collecting back taxes from those exempted
under the unconstitutional tax scheme, is impractical. Moreover,
the collection of back taxes would be politically unpopular with
county residents.155 A fortiori, by classifying the stock clause as an
"illegal exemption," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disposed of
this remedial option.M
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not opt for the third
possible remedy - a partial refund in conjunction with a partial
retroactive tax. As previously discussed, the court probably based
its remedy decision on policy, allowing the Counties to retain the
previously collected tax monies while not proclaiming the
unpopular collection of back taxes. Therefore, in weighing the
interests of the court and the taxpayers, a pragmatic remedy would
be to grant the taxpayers a tax credit equal to the amount of
money unconstitutionally collected from them under the
unconstitutional stock clause, exactly as Justice Cappy suggested.'57
149. Id. at 50-51.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 50.
152. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 50.
153. See Brief for Respondents at 3-4, Annenberg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
575 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000), (No. 0003, 0004 Misc. Dkt. 1997). Montgomery County expected to
procure approximately $27,000,000 from the Personal Property Tax in 1996. Id. at 4. After the
suspension of the collection of the tax in 1997, appropriations to 25 Montgomery County
funded agencies were frozen, and the county asserted that its real estate taxes would
increase by 2996 to compensate for the loss of revenues. Id. at 5.
154. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
155. See Hess, supra note 13 at IlI B.
156. See supra notes 46, 51 and accompanying text.
157. Annenberg II, 757 A-2d at 353.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's remedy may be practical and
justified because it is least disruptive for the Commonwealth and
its Counties - the Counties may keep the monies previously
collected under the tax, thereby retaining their fiscal reserves, with
no resultant politically unpopular action through the retroactive
collection of taxes. However, the county resident taxpayers who
were unconstitutionally deprived of their money through the
payment of an unconstitutional tax have received no restitution for
their past injury. They have not yet been provided with the
"meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional
deprivation"1 8 as required by McKesson - a case that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court seemed to only selectively follow.
Marissa P Viccaro
158. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31.
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